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VITAL MATERIALISM AND THE PROBLEM 
OF ETHICS IN THE RADICAL 
ENLIGHTENMENT * 
Charles T. Wolfe 
ABSTRACT 
From Hegel to Engels, Sartre and Ruyer (Ruyer, 1933), to name only a few, 
materialism is viewed as a necropolis, or the metaphysics befitting such an 
abode; many speak of matter’s crudeness, bruteness, coldness or stupidity. 
Science or scientism, on this view, reduces the living world to ‘dead matter’, 
‘brutish’, ‘mechanical, lifeless matter’, thereby also stripping it of its freedom 
(Crocker, 1959). Materialism is often wrongly presented as ‘mechanistic 
materialism’ – with ‘Death of Nature’ echoes of de-humanization and hostility 
to the Scientific Revolution (which knew nothing of materialism!), also a 
powerful Christian theme in Cudworth, Clarke and beyond (Overhoff, 2000). 
Here I challenge this view, building on some aspects of Israel’s Radical 
Enlightenment concept (Israel, 2001), which has been controversial but for my 
 
                                                             
* Different versions of this text have been presented at the Jan Van Eyck Academy, 
Maastricht (Versus Theory Laboratory), the Université de Poitiers (conference on 
‘Ontologies matérialistes et politique’), and the Departments of Philosophy at UT El Paso 
and the Université de Liège (conference on ‘Technique(s), politique et médiation’), 
between 2009 and 2012. Thanks in particular to J.-Cl. Bourdin, F. Caeymaex, J. Symons, T. 
Tho for their invitations. 
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purposes is a useful claim about the dissemination of a home-grown Spinozism, 
sometimes reformulated as an ontology of the life sciences, an aspect Israel 
does not address (compare Secrétan et al., eds., 2007; Citton, 2006). First, I 
examine some ‘moments’ of radical Enlightenment materialism such as La 
Mettrie and Diderot (including his Encyclopédie entry “Spinosiste”), but also 
anonymous, clandestine texts such as L’Âme Matérielle, to emphasize their 
distinctive focus on the specific existence of organic beings. Second, I show 
how this ‘embodied’, non-mechanistic character of Enlightenment ‘vital 
materialism’ makes it different from other episodes, and perhaps more of an 
ethics than is usually thought (also via the figure of the materialist as ‘laughing 
philosopher’). Third, I reflect on what this implies for our image of the 
Enlightenment – no longer a Frankfurt School and/or Foucaldian vision of 
‘discipline’, regimentation and order (as in Mayr, 1986) – but ‘vital’, without, 
conversely, being a kind of holist vitalism “at odds with the universalizing 
discourse of Encyclopedist materialism, with its insistence on the uniformity of 
nature and the universality of physical laws” (Williams, 2003): vital materialism 
is still materialism. Its ethics tends towards hedonism, but its most radical 
proponents (Diderot, La Mettrie and later Sade) disagree as to what this means. 
 
 
 
 
Le mal, c’est la matière. Arbre noir, fatal fruit. 
(V. Hugo, Les Contemplations1) 
 
 
                                                             
1 Hugo, Les Contemplations, § XXVI: “Ce que dit la bouche d’ombre,” 1855, in Hugo, 
1968, p. 373. 
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1 Introduction: dead matter and the 
opprobrium of materialism 
Materialism has long had a bad reputation, on two distinct yet related 
grounds: that it reduces everything to ‘dead’ matter, and that it 
eliminates the ‘higher’, intellectual or spiritual parts of life, and thereby 
cannot but be immoral. This set of accusations came to a head in the 
period we now know as the Radical Enlightenment,2 when, building on 
Paduan Averroist Aristotelianism (e.g. Pomponazzi), neo-Epicureanism 
and other partly clandestine elements, thinkers first assert themselves 
as materialists, boldly and confidently. I ask whether these materialists, 
preachers of the pleasures of the flesh and otherwise deniers of an 
immortal or any other transcendent source of normativity (and thus 
basis for reward or punishment) were as coldly mechanistic and 
immoral as we are often told. 
It has been said that the history of philosophy is the history of 
idealism. This is of interest, less as a truth claim (surely dependent on 
all sorts of presuppositions about the nature of philosophy, among 
others), and more because of it what it reveals. The import of this 
revelation is twofold: philosophy frequently and canonically has 
understood itself as idealism, both because of its opprobrium against 
materialism, and because of the reflexive belief – inseparably systematic 
and historical – that from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes, Kant and 
 
                                                             
2 I am not concerned in this paper with (a) the difference between Margaret Jacob’s and 
Jonathan Israel’s concepts of ‘radical Enlightenment’ or (b) the internal conceptual 
success and consistency of the latter (heavily debated e.g. in Secrétan et al., eds., 2007). 
But since Israel’s concept focuses on Spinozism – which I take as more of a construct 
than a real relation to Spinoza (following Citton, 2006) – and since Israel gives Diderot 
and La Mettrie pride of place in the conclusion of his 2001, my discussion is much closer 
to his. 
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Hegel (and beyond), a philosophy is at its core a system of interlocking 
principles with a rational foundation. On this view, it cannot be an 
appeal to merely empirical, contingent properties, and still less a 
‘reductionist’ explanation of the higher-level (consciousness, 
intentionality, action overall) in terms of the neuronal or biochemical 
properties of nematodes, sea slugs, macaques or orangutans. All true 
philosophies are then forms of idealism, while materialism is 
Unphilosophie, non-philosophy (Colletti, 1969, pp. 10, 35-36) – a 
position that has a Hegelian ring to it (after all, for Hegel, “Every 
philosophy is an idealism” [Hegel, 1971, p. 124]), but that extends 
beyond: Schopenhauer had declared that the “true philosophy” was in 
any case idealism, while materialism is the philosophy of “the subject 
who forgets to account” for herself.3 
The opposition between idealism and materialism certainly runs 
deep. Plato, in the Sophist (246b-c), features a ‘battle of giants’ 
(gigantomachia) between the Lovers of Forms and those he calls the 
Sons of the Earth, his early version of the figures we might call the 
‘crude materialists’. The latter come in different guises, for Plato: there 
are those who explain everything about our bodies and life in terms of 
the Earth, and thereby confuse human life with the existence of trees 
and stones; there are those who obsessively take apart reality into tiny 
atomic components and view the universe as perpetually changing.4 
The stupidity of such thinkers is mirrored (or matched) by the 
purported stupidity of matter itself, a motif much belabored in early 
modernity: e.g., the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth speaks of 
 
                                                             
3 Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, II, 1 (“Zur idealistischen 
Grundansicht”), in Schopenhauer, 1977, pp. 11, 27. All translations are my own unless 
otherwise indicated. 
4 For Aristotle’s far more sophisticated presentation of and ‘debate’ with materialism see 
Wolfe, 2004-2005. 
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“stupid and senseless Matter” (Cudworth, 1731, Bk. I, chapter II, § 8, in 
Cudworth, 1897, p. 839). 
This theme of the ‘stupidity’ of matter reaches something of a fever 
point in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: for Cudworth, 
“Mind and Intellect are a higher, more real and substantial Thing than 
senseless Body and Matter,” and he of course denied that “all Being and 
Perfection that is found in the World” could “spring up and arise out of 
the dark Womb of unthinking Matter” (slightly mixing metaphors,  one 
might say: Cudworth, op. cit., § 13, p. 846). The great Jansenist Pierre 
Nicole, who significantly influenced Locke, also wrote around the same 
time that one cannot conceive of “this dead and unfeeling mass we call 
matter” as being “an eternal being”; it is clear, Nicole continues, that 
“matter lacks any internal cause of its existence . . . it is ridiculous to 
attribute to the most vile and despicable of all beings, the greatest of 
perfections, which is to exist by oneself [d'être par soi-même]” (Nicole, 
1671, in Nicole, 1714, p. 27). The Jesuit Dictionnaire de Trévoux (first 
edition, 1704) does not insult matter or materialism for what it does to 
“perfections” such as intelligence or autonomous existence, but opts for 
an equally successful strategy of discrediting it – here in dictionary 
entry form, in the entry ‘Matériel’: 
Material also means massive, gross. . . . These walls, these 
foundations are too material. This watch is not subtle, it is too 
material. One also says of a witless man, or one who is too fond 
of the pleasures of the senses, that he is quite material, he has a 
thick and material physiognomy (Dictionnaire de Trévoux, 
1704, II, n.p.).  
Sometimes this pathos of hatred for matter can, surprisingly, alternate 
within the same author with a passion for its vitality: Alexander Pope, 
for instance, exclaimed – quite conventionally – that  “There's nought 
in simple Matter to delight / 'Tis the fair Workmanship that takes the 
Sight,” so that “Where Mind is not, there Horror needs must be /For 
Matter formless, is Deformity,” but also, closer to the ‘vital’ materialism 
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discussed in this essay, insist on matter as inherently alive: “All matter 
quick, and bursting into birth.”5 
There would be more to say about this sometimes accidental, 
sometimes deliberate slippage between the hatred for matter and the 
hatred for the thinkers who ‘defend’ it – first called ‘materialists’, in 
fact, by another Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, in his 1668 Divine 
Dialogues: in the cast of characters, he describes the character 
Hylobares as “A young, witty, and well moralised Materialist”6 (it seems 
to have been Leibniz who introduced the term into French, at least in 
mainstream philosophical usage, for it occurs in clandestine texts as 
early as the 1670s7) – but this is not the place, although the Radical 
Enlightenment was, it is worth mentioning, the context in which the 
term ‘materialist ‘ is first used by a thinker, La Mettrie, to describe 
himself, rather than strictly as a term of opprobrium (Bloch, 1995). 
Indeed, in a remarkable display of continuity despite highly diverse 
intellectual, theological and political contexts, this contempt for ‘crude 
materialism’ runs at least as far as the twentieth century, via Hegel, 
Engels and Sartre. Moreover, it crosses between a ‘metaphysical’ form 
of contempt (as in Cudworth, Nicole or the Dictionnaire de Trévoux 
cited above), a more historicized form, which becomes canonical for a 
certain brand of Marxism, as presented notably by Engels in the late 
nineteenth century: 
The materialism of the past century was predominantly 
mechanistic, because at that time . . . only the science of 
 
                                                             
5 Respectively, Pope, 1735, p. 345; Pope 1958, Epistle I, section VIII, p. 44. 
6 More, 1668, pp. 5-6. It seems the character of Hylobares was inspired by More’s pupil 
Thomas Baines, who was Lady Anne Conway’s brother (Mintz, 1962, p. 89). 
7 Bloch, 1995, is the basic source here, to which one can add Benítez, 1998, p. 355 (where 
he signals an even earlier usage of the term in French, in Friedrich Spanheim’s 1676 
L’impie convaincu). 
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mechanics . . . had reached any sort of completion. . . . For the 
materialists of the eighteenth century, man was a machine. 
This exclusive application of the standards of mechanics to 
processes of a chemical and organic nature – in which the laws 
of mechanics are also valid, but are pushed into the background 
by other, higher laws – constitutes the specific (and at that 
time, inevitable) limitation of classical French materialism.
8
 
and even a more scholarly form, which we shall encounter several times 
in this essay – and part of my aim will to be rebut its historiographical 
form –, in which it is deemed necessary to insist that Enlightenment 
materialism was necessarily a “mechanistic materialism.” Here, for 
example, is a description from a scholarly study of physical concepts in 
the Encyclopédie, from fifty years ago: 
the strongest, most pronounced characteristic of the 
metaphysics we find in the materialism of the ‘encyclopédistes’, 
is the reduction of all forms of the motion of matter to 
mechanical motion, and of all changes in the universe to the 
merely ‘local changes’ of a permanently self-identical and 
unchangeable matter. It is a mechanistic materialism.
9
 
I observe that this contempt (which here presents itself as merely a 
constat of historical limitations) crosses between metaphysics, history 
of philosophy and scholarship, also because the more strongly 
normative language we encountered in the seventeenth-century texts 
cited above somehow returns also in Marxist humanist form, e.g. in 
 
                                                             
8 F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie 
(1888), in Marx & Engels, 1982, p. 278 (translation mine); in English in Marx & Engels, 
1959, p. 211. 
9 Vassails, 1951, p. 315, referring to the article “MOUVEMENT” (to which one can add the 
article “MATIÈRE”). 
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Sartre’s well-known essay “Materialism and Revolution” (1946). Sartre 
describes materialism here as “the subjectivity of those who are 
ashamed of their subjectivity” (Sartre, 1990, p. 99); materialism claims 
to be all about reason, but within the materialist perspective, reason is 
“captive, governed from outside, manipulated by blind causal chains” 
(p. 86). Nature here is “pure externality” (p. 94), purely mechanical (pp. 
89-90), in sharp contrast with the world of values and action: “ a causal 
chain can lead me to a movement, a  behavior but not … to my grasping 
of my situation as a totality. It cannot … account for revolutionary class-
consciousness” (p. 120).  In sum, materialism is Taylorism: “materialism, 
by decomposing man into rigorously defined behaviors like in 
Taylorism, serves the purposes of the master: it is the master who 
conceives of the slave as being like a machine” (pp. 127-128). 
Nor is this analysis restricted to a now-vanished Hegelian Marxist 
tradition: a prominent work in ‘enactivist’ cognitive science of recent 
years declares boldly that “Life is not physical in the standard 
materialist sense of purely external structure and function … [w]e 
accordingly need an expanded notion of the physical to account for the 
organism or living being” (Thompson, 2007, p. 238), a point of view 
reflecting an enduring trend in phenomenology.10 In sum, materialism 
is frequently portrayed as some combination of stupidity and 
wickedness – “dead matter,” “mechanical, lifeless matter,” “brutish 
matter” or – which is not the same, as we shall see – as evil itself, as in 
Hugo’s verse which forms the epigraph of this essay:  “evil is matter 
itself. Dark tree, fatal fruit,” versus a varying combination of Life, Value 
and Freedom. 
 
                                                             
10 One thinks also of Husserl’s war against positivism, his bizarre ten-year plans to 
refound each science on a new eidetic basis as a science of essences, his rants against 
laboratories and “experimental fanatics” (Husserl, 1910-1911, p. 304); cf. also the 
“scientistic fanaticism” of our time (ibid., p. 338). 
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Faced with this situation, some twentieth-century thinkers sought to 
introduce materialism into the history of philosophy, from Althusser 
onwards – and one should not confuse this more sophisticated project11 
with the older diktats of ‘dialectical materialism’ or the more dogmatic 
attempts to present, e.g. Helvétius or Diderot as heroes of a kind of class 
struggle in philosophy avant la lettre (a classic instance of which is 
Plekhanov, 1934). Or one can seek to historicize the practice of the 
history of philosophy itself, in order to detect its Kantian (and 
otherwise idealistic) leanings (Haakonssen, 2006). Here my aim is more 
limited: to call attention (historically and philosophically) to three 
distinctive features of materialism in the period and particular 
intellectual constellation called the Radical Enlightenment, in order to 
draw some conclusions about its purportedly immoral character. 
2 Three features of vital materialism 
First, I emphasize that matter here is vital rather than stupid or 
mechanistic – much more like Pope’s “quick, and bursting into birth,” 
or Diderot’s description of materialism as the most “seductive” or 
“alluring” philosophy (Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, § LI, in 
Diderot, 1975-, IX, p. 84). (One might wonder, then, what Cudworth, 
More and others were targeting; in the English context it is of course 
Hobbesian materialism, which indeed possesses no particular vital 
emphasis, but even a generation later, the hostile reactions to Julien 
 
                                                             
11 Jean-Claude Bourdin’s reading of Hegel on materialism, but also of the challenging 
presence of what we would now call ‘Radical Enlightenment’ materialism within Hegel’s 
historical presentation of philosophy, is a noteworthy attempt in this regard (Bourdin 
1992). 
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Offray de La Mettrie’s Homme-Machine insisted equally on its cold, 
mindless, automatic character – basically a reaction to the title rather 
than contents of the book, which are a hundred percent organismic, so 
to speak, with no reduction of organic properties to the more basic 
properties of inorganic matter.)  
But second, I note that this vital character does not mean that 
materialism here loses its reductionist character. Consider a 
representative example, precisely from La Mettrie’s L’Homme-Machine, 
as regards the soul: 
The soul is just a pointless term of which we have no idea and 
which a good mind should only use to refer to that part of us 
which thinks. Given the slightest principle of movement, 
animate bodies will have everything they need to move, feel, 
think, repent and in a word, behave in the physical realm as 
well as the moral realm which depends on it (La Mettrie, 1987, 
I, p. 98). 
Despite the fact that La Mettrie’s book is called Man a Machine it does 
not reduce living entities to the status of inanimate machines 
(Thomson, 1988; Wolfe, 2012). Not only could ‘machine’ be used in the 
French of the period to mean ‘body’; La Mettrie’s reductionism is a 
reduction to the organic. When he speaks of watches and springs – 
classic mechanist analogies – he is careful to point out that the object of 
his analysis, the body, is a “self-winding” machine (La Mettrie, 1987, I, p. 
69).12 Notice that this kind of reduction is less focused on the ultimate 
 
                                                             
12 Vitalism and mechanism in the period are in fact entirely syncretistic compounds, 
hybrids of whatever ‘pure’ form of these concepts might have existed. Two examples: 
the vitalist physician Ménuret speaks of the “human machine” as “a harmonious 
composite of various springs, each of which is impelled by its own motion but (which) 
all concur in the general motion” (Ménuret, 1765, p. 435b, emphasis mine); the anti-
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nature of the space-time world and its physical components, and more 
on particular identities such as brain-mind or body-soul – which 
happen to be more ‘embodied’ or vital. 
Third, that this form of materialism is vital without losing sight of its 
demystificatory, reductionist aims leads, in my analysis to a third 
distinctive feature: it displays a ‘Rabelaisian’ tendency (in the sense 
analysed in Bakhtin, 1984, of an impulse to reveal ‘lower’, corporeal 
and/or affective urges at the root of ‘higher’ socio-cultural formations) 
to laugh at humanity, particularly at social and ethical norms – a far cry 
from the materialism of D.M. Armstrong or David Lewis, in the 
twentieth century. That this form of materialism laughs at norms can 
also be termed its ‘Democritean’ heritage, as discussed below (with 
reference to the figure of Democritus as the laughing philosopher). And 
thereby, it is not such a stranger to ethics, although it tends to be the 
enemy of social stability. As La Mettrie wrote presciently, “he who 
chooses man as an object of study must expect to have man as an 
enemy” (Discours sur le bonheur, in La Mettrie, 1987, II, p. 269). 
In other words, the excitement surrounding Radical Enlightenment 
materialism, even if it is not strictly unique to the period (one thinks of 
the impact of Lucretius’ De rerum natura), is nevertheless quite distinct 
from materialism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, where it 
seems to be something of an ancilla scientiae, a ‘valet’ of and conceptual 
clarifier for successful science. The materialism at issue here has an 
ideological but also an affective component which (a) is a differentia 
specifica of the Radical Enlightenment and (b) may, at least partly, put 
the lie to the enduring vision that materialism either is not an ethics, or 
is immoral. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
materialist Abbé Lelarge de Lignac speaks of the “organic resources on which the 
machine draws for its [self]-preservation” (Lelarge de Lignac, 1760, I, p. 175). 
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One often reads that “it is impossible to reconcile ethics and 
materialism” (that quotation is in fact from an early, and important 
work on Diderot: Mornet, 1941, p. 54). Or, just as blunt but somehow 
more complex-sounding: 
Materialism as a working philosophy, used as a tool in the 
scientific investigation of the material universe, is appropriate 
and highly effective. Intended for the objective analysis and 
description of the world of externals, it yields disastrous results 
when applied to the inner, subjective world of human nature, 
human thought, and human emotions (Hill, 1968, p. 90). 
In a way, we are still in the paroxysms of anti-materialism that identify 
matter, or materialism, with radical evil. To mention another famous 
example, this was also the judgment of Dostoievski in The Brothers 
Karamazov, in which Ivan, the brother who represents science, 
reductionism, and the promise of the Enlightenment, is also the one 
who ushers in the greatest evils of all. Indeed, from Cudworth and – 
paradoxically, in political terms – Hegel, Engels and Sartre, to Hans 
Jonas and his disciple, the conservative bioethicist Leon Kass (Kass, 
2002), it is rare to find a denunciation of materialism that does not 
blend the metaphysical (like Raymond Ruyer’s “Le matérialisme est 
radicalement faux, et faux sous toutes ses formes” [Ruyer, 1930, p. 42]) 
with the ethical. 
Sometimes, faced with this verdict, well-meaning thinkers like 
Pierre Bayle come up with compromise or hybrid figures such as the 
‘virtuous atheist’, namely Spinoza: didn’t he live an exemplary life?13 
 
                                                             
13 “Ceux qui ont eu quelques habitudes avec Spinoza, et les paysans du village où il vécut 
en retraite pendant quelque temps, s’accordent à dire que c’était un homme d’un bon 
commerce, affable, honnête, officieux, et fort réglé dans ses mœurs” (Bayle, article 
“Spinoza” in Bayle 1740, IV, p. 257); see also the partly analogous description of Vanini’s 
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Doesn’t this show that it is possible to be a materialist without 
necessarily being immoral? This is presumably what Diderot had in 
mind when he reacted thus: “It would seem that libertinage is a 
necessary consequence of materialism, which doesn’t seem to conform 
in my view with reason or with experience” (Diderot, Observations sur 
Hemsterhuis, in Diderot, 1994, p. 695). Materialism does not have to 
entail a Sadian pursuit of crimes against nature. Yet there is a problem 
here, since, even if it is not a necessary consequence, it certainly seems 
like a possible consequence (even without equating matter with 
fallenness and inhumanity, or materialism with “disastrous” 
applications to “the inner, subjective world of human nature, human 
thought, and human emotions,” as Emita Hill claims). But to his credit, 
Diderot correctly identifies the real problem. 
Amongst the various eighteenth-century accusations against 
materialism, a typical one was that it reduced man to an automaton, an 
accusation made by Emperor Frederick the Great himself (whose 
patronage of La Mettrie did not imply full agreement with his views, in 
any case):  
The principle of fatalism [fatalité] has dire consequences for 
society; if we grant it, we must consider men to be only 
machines, some made for vice, some for virtue – neither 
praiseworthy nor blameworthy on their own, and thus unable 
 
                                                                                                                                         
virtuous life and death in § 182 of the Pensées diverses sur la comète, in Bayle, 1737, p. 
117 (also § 174, p. 111); Israel, 2001, ch. 18; more focus on Spinoza and Bayle in Dagron, 
2009, 193f. Diderot’s version of the virtuous atheist is presented in his late ‘tale’, the 
Entretien avec la Maréchale de *** (Diderot, 1994, p. 929f.). 
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to be punished or rewarded: this eats away at morals, proper 
living and the foundations on which society rests.14 
More precisely, the ‘automaton’ danger implied the charge of 
immoralism for the eighteenth century (when we worry today, or 
perhaps more frequently in the 1950s-1960s, about the effects of 
automation or the interplay between robotic labor and human labor, we 
do not normally think of immoralism as part of the problem). 
Immoralism was the real danger for apologeticists and other anti-
materialists, 15 for at least two reasons. First, because this was indeed an 
obvious consequence of the theory, as Diderot himself recognized. 
Second, because it was a consequence embraced by at least one 
prominent contemporary of Diderot’s: La Mettrie (to whom we can add 
the Marquis de Sade in the later decades of the century, unknown to 
Diderot; Sade actually considered La Mettrie to be one of his greatest 
predecessors, going so far as to compose a philosophical poem called 
“La Vérité,” The Truth … and attribute its authorship to La Mettrie16). La 
Mettrie, in addition to claiming the term ‘materialist’ as a self-
description, led, like some other contemporaries such as Radicati, a life 
marked by a (courageous? foolhardy?) willingness to embrace 
 
                                                             
14 Frédéric II, “Examen critique du Système de la nature” (1770), in Frederick II, 1985, 
p.393. For a similar charge see also Bergier, 1769, I, pp. 282, 458; discussion in Citton, 
2006, p. 175. 
15 For some fascinating analysis of the ‘enemies of materialism’ in this period, see 
Chouillet, ed., 1993 and Masseau, 2000. 
16 ‘La Vérité, pièce trouvée parmi les papiers de La Mettrie’ (1787), in Sade, 1986. 
However, La Mettrie’s medical stance makes him explicitly amoral (or, concerned with 
an ethics of pleasure to which the doctor can contribute knowledge of the body); Sade is 
more of a reverse moralist, as has been said at least since Adorno & Horkheimer’s 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. In ‘La Vérité’ he speaks of ‘insulting Nature’ (Sade, 1986, p. 
553). Francine Markovits has also observed that in his works on pleasure such as L’Art 
de jouir, La Mettrie, contrary to Sade, does not put forth any ‘combinatorics of pleasure’. 
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radicalism,  entailing a particularly sharp path of flight from 
persecution, first from France to Holland, then from Holland to 
Potsdam, at the court of Frederick II – a decision which we might see as 
desperate, and thus understandable, but was held against him by other 
materialists such as Diderot, who felt that seeking shelter from a 
despotic ruler was a direct contradiction to their values.  
Before we turn to Diderot’s reaction, La Mettrie’s embrace of 
immoralism, but also its social and political ramifications, needs to be 
made clearer. I will suggest, somewhat dialectically, that its hedonistic, 
‘swinish’ brutality does not exhaust the ethical options available to the 
vital materialist in the Radical Enlightenment (notably, because some of 
these have adumbrations of either a ‘sympathy’ theory, and/or a 
Spinozist, relational ontology in which we are both cognitively and 
metaphysically interlinked with the rest of humanity, and thereby not 
solitary ‘wolves’ or ‘swine’). Yet this brutality, in its Democritean-
Rabelaisian ramifications, is also a constitutive materialist ‘mode of 
access’ to the ethical. 
3 La Mettrie and Diderot: aporias of 
materialist hedonism 
La Mettrie’s ethics, as presented in his Discours sur le Bonheur or Anti-
Sénèque, is hedonistic, including in the non-traditional sense 
(consonant with his overall medical materialism) that it is about us 
organic beings, who can be understood better by the doctor than by the 
traditional moralist. He thinks the only kind of happiness we can pursue 
is an “organic, automatic happiness” (“le bonheur organique, 
automatique ou naturel,” La Mettrie, 1987, II, p. 244) rather than what 
we might call an ideological happiness. That is, he rejects what he calls 
the “privative happiness” of the Stoics (p. 239), which consists in 
46 C. WOLFE 
 
fearing nothing and desiring nothing; its chief figures, in his view, are 
Seneca and Descartes. Privative happiness is opposed to “organic, 
automatic or natural” happiness, which is natural because “our soul has 
nothing to do with it,” and organic because it “derives from our 
organisation” (p. 244). This happiness is automatic in the sense that it 
obeys the laws of operation of our ‘machine’ – which, as I have indicated 
above, is not to be confused with an ordinary mechanism, like a watch; 
but this does not make our behavior any more free, stricto sensu. 
Worse, it leads to a particular kind of determinism of our urges: 
“Wallow in filth like pigs and you will be happy like pigs’” (La Mettrie, 
1987, II, p. 286); of course, the subtle issue then becomes, what is the 
status of ‘like’ here? Is there room for what Mill was to call ‘higher 
pleasures’? Regardless, it what this aspect which particularly incensed 
his contemporaries (and delighted Sade). 
La Mettrie was the object of an enormous amount of hostility, in his 
lifetime and up until the present. In addition to these proclamations 
about living like pigs, to which we can a variety of other statements 
about the impossibility of really judging criminals, and the necessity of 
following our impulses (“these unfortunate ones . . . were driven by a 
fatal necessity”: “we are not criminals by following the primitive 
motions which govern us, any more than the Nile is criminal when it 
floods”17), that La Mettrie died eating (or rather pursuant to a very 
abundant meal of an entire “pheasant pasty filled with truffles,” as 
described by Voltaire to Richelieu in a letter of November 13th, 1751, two 
days after La Mettrie’s death), was one obvious proof that materialism 
was a philosophy for pigs. As late as 1969, his work was described as a 
“cynical appeal to gluttonery, to libation, to the complete plenitude of 
the belly” (Velluz, 1969, p. 112). Indeed, this hostility targeted his ethics 
 
                                                             
17 L’Homme-Machine, in La Mettrie, 1987, I, p. 92 ; Système d’Epicure, § xlviii, in ibid., p. 
370. 
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more than his materialist metaphysics even if much of the rhetoric also 
focused on the ‘Monsieur Machine’ motif: a French Protestant historian 
of French literature in the mid-nineteenth century, Sayous, described 
him as a “lecherous (or sleazy) metaphysician of physical pleasure” 
(“métaphysicien lubrique de la volupté”18); the great naturalist 
Réaumur called him a monster and regrets that he died “in the 
horizontal position” (Letter to Formey, December 3d, 1751). 
But most important for our purposes is that his fellow materialist  
Diderot declared that he “died as he had to die, a victim of his own 
intemperance and madness; he killed himself by his ignorance of his 
professed art.”19 Indeed, Diderot did not just express a judgment of the 
intemperance of his fellow materialist, as if, perhaps, he (Diderot) was 
the more authentic Epicurean. He also denounced La Mettrie for 
claiming that “man was perverse by nature,” for reassuring the evildoer 
(scélérat) that he may commit crimes, and “le corrompu” (we would 
probably say ‘the pervert’) that he may “pursue his vices.” It is in this 
sense that La Mettrie was, for Diderot, “an author lacking the first idea 
of the true foundations of morals, . . . whose principles would . . . ensure 
immortality for the evildoer” (Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de 
Néron, II, 6, in Diderot, 1994, pp. 1118-1119). 
Now, La Mettrie was not just some prodrome of a dark prophet of 
desire, like Sade (or a more Pasolinian version of the same, a 
spokesperson for the libidinal energies of fascism): he was also an 
exceptionally honest writer, at the expense of his own safety and 
 
                                                             
18 Sayous, Histoire de la littérature française à l’étranger (1853), cit. Leduc-Fayette, 1979, 
p. 108. 
19 Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron, II, 6, in Diderot, 1994, p. 1119 (see also the 
Observations sur Hemsterhuis, where he calls La Mettrie an “apologist of crime”). For 
more on La Mettrie’s death see Wolfe, 2006 ; for more on the Diderot – La Mettrie 
tension see Kaitaro, 2004. 
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wellbeing: in the “Discours préliminaire” he composed for the edition of 
his complete philosophical writings, he declared unambiguously that 
“the more one is a philosopher, the more one is a bad citizen” (Discours 
préliminaire, in La Mettrie, 1987, I, p. 18). Not only does this hark back 
to the venerable figure of Socrates; it also perfectly expresses 
sentiments Diderot had, and on which he wrote about in various places, 
albeit usually more hidden than La Mettrie. Diderot did describe himself 
as “a monster . . . enough so to coexist ill at ease [sc. with others], not 
monster enough to be exterminated” (fragment now considered to be 
from a letter to Grimm, 1768, in Diderot, 1955-1970, vol. 3, p. 188n.). 
Why is it important that Diderot parts ways with La Mettrie? Was it 
just mere cowardice? Unfortunately the situation is not that simple. 
One fairly accepted reading is that it was a tension between reformism 
and radicalism. That is, Diderot was upset by the nakedness with which 
La Mettrie expressed their otherwise common radicalism, fueled by a 
cheerfully destructive materialist project? In fact, there is a socio-
political dimension to La Mettrie’s hedonism, which differs markedly 
from the reformist or revolutionary hopes of Diderot and his fellow 
radical Aufklärer. It is important to grasp that La Mettrie was not a 
political revolutionary: his is a matérialisme de cabinet. Sometimes it 
could be sarcasm: “I applaud your Laws, your mores, even your Religion, 
almost as much as I applaud your gallows and your scaffold” (Discours 
préliminaire, in La Mettrie, 1987, I, p. 25). But other times, there is a 
clearly stated relativism: 
Materialists may prove that Man is but a Machine, but the 
people will never believe it. 
To which he adds a footnote: 
What harm would there be, if they [sc. the people] did believe 
it? Thanks to the severity of the laws, they could be Spinozists, 
without society having to fear the destruction of its altars, 
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which is where this hardy system appears to lead (Discours 
préliminaire, in La Mettrie, 1987, I, p. 20). 
Moderates like Voltaire dislike the entire package: he observed after La 
Mettrie’s death that “There is a great deal of difference between 
fighting the superstitions of man and breaking the social bond and the 
chains of virtue” (Voltaire to Richelieu, January 27, 1752). Let me 
suggest that the materialist philosopher faced with the ethical is always 
in a space circumscribed by these two possibilities. The honour of the 
materialist is that she will always move towards the latter, she will 
always be deflationary, which is the analytic philosopher’s word for 
destructive. Even Adorno notices this: “Der Materialismus hat 
prinzipiell eine demaskienderende Tendenz.”20 
So why did Diderot attack La Mettrie? Diderot’s angst is that he 
agreed with the materialism (indeed, with the more specifically organic 
materialism and its frequent appeals to medicine as a source of 
explanations of human behavior and norms: it was not La Mettrie but 
Diderot who wrote, “it is quite difficult to be a good metaphysician and 
a good moralist, without being an anatomist, a naturalist, a physiologist 
and a physician”21) but could not stomach the ethics and especially the 
relativism – although in the Encyclopédie entry ‘Locke’ Diderot defends 
the hypothesis of thinking matter, also by emphasizing that even if this 
hypothesis turned out to be true, it would change nothing in the 
workings of our juridical and social institutions.22 
Diderot, too, thinks we are flesh-and-blood creatures with drives and 
urges, and that the ‘blood that flows in our veins’ (to use a popular 
image of the time, which both La Mettrie and Diderot employ) 
 
                                                             
20 Philosophische Terminologie II, 1974, p. 172, cit. in Benítez, 1996, p. 307.  
21 Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé L’Homme, in Diderot, 1994, p. 813.. 
22 Diderot, 1975- VII, pp. 714-715, as noted in Nakagawa, 1995, p. 28. 
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determines whether we will be a saint or a murder, a genius or a fool. 
When reading the manuscript De l’homme by the Dutch scientist (and 
Platonist) Franz Hemsterhuis, he wrote in the margin “Wherever I read 
soul , I replace it with man or animal”; he also gave a succinct statement 
of his embodied reductionism as “the action of the soul on the body is 
the action of one part of the body on another, and the action of the 
body on the soul is again that of one part of the body on another.”23 
There is an explicit Lucretian background here, notably to the 
discussion of ‘material soul’ in De rerum natura. For instance, Lucretius 
describes how, just as the scent of incense cannot be removed from the 
incense without its essence perishing, similarly the essence of the soul 
or mind cannot be extracted from the body without everything 
dissolving. They live, Lucretius says, of one life (III, 327-330). In an 
anonymous French work from the 1720s entitled L’Âme Matérielle, this 
is rendered in a more crisp form, closer to Diderot: “the soul is to the 
body as scent is to incense” (“L’âme est au corps comme l’odeur à 
l’encens,” Anon., 2003, p. 174). 
However, Diderot allows much room for our ‘modifiability’, as he 
calls it: our corrigibility by institutions and overall affective 
environment. While he is by no means a theorist of sympathy as a 
defining feature of our moral psychology, like Hume or Smith, Diderot 
has a strongly social concept of self, more so than La Mettrie: “He who 
has studied himself, will have advanced in the knowledge of others, 
given, I think, that there is no virtue which is foreign to the wicked, nor 
vice foreign to the good” (Essai sur les règnes de Claude et Néron, in 
Diderot, 1994, p. 1103). Diderot’s vital materialism is more concerned 
with taking into account our ‘sentiments for others’, which brings to 
mind sympathy – a concept he uses, yet he almost never makes the 
 
                                                             
23 Diderot, Observations sur Hemsterhuis, in Diderot, 1994, p. 734 ; Éléments de 
physiologie, in Diderot, 1975-, XVII, pp. 334-335. 
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move from an older, organic concept of ‘sympathies’24, to a ‘Scottish 
Enlightenment’ focus on the moral psychology of sympathy. 
We could say Diderot has more of a relational ontology, both in 
general and when it comes to the individual. This will prove to be an 
important conceptual resource for materialism as faced with the 
challenge of ethics, as we shall see below. But, as I suggested earlier, 
among the core characteristics of Radical Enlightenment materialism 
are also its unique brand of reductionism, which is not to be understood 
as a mere facilitator of scientific practice. And this uniquely corporeal 
reductionism is hard to separate from the darker side of the issue, 
which Diderot dislikes. 
The Diderot – La Mettrie ‘debate’ is essentially about the key aporias 
of the Radical Enlightenment when it comes to ethics and materialism, 
but there is of course a third figure who represents something of a 
terminus ad quem or limit-case for the excesses of materialist 
radicalism in ethics: the Divine Marquis as Apollinaire called him: Sade. 
Following a now-established interpretive line that runs from 
Klossowski, Adorno and Bataille onto Simone de Beauvoir, Lacan, 
Angela Carter and Annie Le Brun, Sade can be seen as the actualization 
of a certain limit-possibility in the Enlightenment. In fact, Sade is a 
tricky character in this regard, for he effectively seeks to blend what I 
 
                                                             
24 Cf. the Encyclopédie entry “SYMPATHIE (Physiolog.)” by De Jaucourt: “Il s'agit ici de 
cette communication qu'ont les parties du corps les unes avec les autres, qui les tient 
dans une dépendance, une position, une souffrance mutuelle, et qui transporte à l'une 
des douleurs, les maladies qui affligent l'autre. Il est vrai pourtant que cette 
communication produisait aussi quelquefois par le même mécanisme un transport, un 
enchaînement de sensations agréables. La sympathie, en physique anatomique, est donc 
l'harmonie, l'accord mutuel qui règne entre diverses parties du corps humain par 
l'entremise des nerfs, merveilleusement arrangés, et distribués pour cet effet” 
(Jaucourt, 1765, p. 736a). The vast majority of occurrences of the term in the 
Encyclopédie are in a medical or chemical sense. 
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am calling the reductionist dimension with a kind of transcendental 
dimension, a negative theology, as Blanchot and Klossowski pointed out 
in the post-war years (Blanchot, 1949/1963; Klossowski, 1947/1967). 
4 From the libertine to the laughing 
philosopher: a possible ethics? 
Consider the figure of the libertine. The libertine (i) borrows from 
proper materialist boilerplate on atoms, molecules, the electric fluid 
flowing within us (“pleasure is just the encounter of pleasurable atoms 
… setting fire to the electric particles in our nerves,” our bodies are 
“electrified by libertinage”: Histoire de Juliette, in Sade, 1998, pp. 482, 
184), (ii) suddenly turns this against nature with great vehemence 
(sodomy, all forms of non-reproductive sexuality), yet in the name of a 
kind of great abstract Nature with a capital N, a destructive nature, 
mère marâtre – and (iii) realizes that this has left no room for himself as 
an agent of destruction, and hence screams with pain and rage. 
However (contrary to Klossowski), the operative issue in my view is 
not the theology of the Supreme Being in Wickedness, but rather how 
far the Radical Enlightenment can go on its immoralist journey or 
better put, how far it can take its constitutive materialism in an 
immoralist direction – precisely what horrified figures like Rousseau 
and Kant, who in that sense do belong to a ‘Moderate Enlightenment’. 
To be sure, Spinoza, La Mettrie, Diderot, Sade and Democritus 
‘redivivus’ do not all teach us something uniform and consistent about 
materialism and the ethical (witness the tension even between Diderot 
and La Mettrie), but their example makes for a very different 
Enlightenment narrative from that emphasizing liberal, representative 
democracy, rights, republicanism and so on (see Negri’s invigorating 
remarks on what he calls Spinoza’s “anti-modernity,” Negri, 2004) – a 
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more ‘Kantian-Habermasian’ narrative which curiously seems to have 
become predominant in Israel’s later writings. 
The question is not whether La Mettrie, Diderot or Sade is right 
(after Wilhelm Reich, Herbert Marcuse and current appeals to a ‘politics 
of affects’ [Negri, 1997; Citton and Lordon, eds., 2008], the jury is still 
out) but that materialism has a necessarily destructive component, or 
drive, or persona. It is important to notice, even if I can only mention 
this briefly, that this destructive moment, what Flaubert called “the 
cruelty of the anatomist” (“c’est une cruauté d’anatomiste mais on a fait 
des progrès dans les sciences et il y a des gens qui dissèquent un cœur 
comme un cadavre” – in fact an old topos: one eighteenth-century critic 
of Locke’s doctrine of personal identity, Matthew Prior, complained that 
Locke had “cut up” the soul “like an Anatomy”25), is not merely a 
moment of stating a formula as in classical reductionism, so that our 
subjective qualitative experience of things is replaced with a nice, 
impersonal third-person statement, as in ‘Heat is the more or less 
violent agitation of molecules’. If it were so, this would not be 
negligible: it would count as a major articulation of naturalism; it would 
be ‘science-friendly’. But the materialist shouldn’t be content with this. 
If she is, then materialism will remain in the (legitimate, but restricted) 
role of a kind of handmaiden of science, an ideological bulldog in the 
fights with the enemies of science – except, and here La Mettrie’s fate is 
really quite telling, the materialist is always sacrificed very quickly in 
these conflicts where, from Cudworth, Newton, Samuel Clarke and John 
Ray to William Paley and John Hedley-Brooke, we are always reminded 
that science does not itself countenance atheism. 
If the reductive and destructive moment is neither just an apology of 
crime nor an ontological reduction to primary qualities or otherwise 
 
                                                             
25 Flaubert, 1837, in Flaubert, 1925, p. 254; Prior, A Dialogue between Mr. John Lock and 
Seigneur de Montaigne, 1721, in Prior, 1971, vol. 1, p. 622. 
54 C. WOLFE 
 
manageable physical entities and processes, what is it? Recall our brief 
allusions to the figure of Democritus, the laughing philosopher, and La 
Mettrie’s bravado in declaring “he who chooses man as an object of 
study must expect to have man as an enemy” (Discours sur le bonheur, 
in La Mettrie, 1987, II, p. 269). Elsewhere I have tried to analyse this 
figure of the laughing philosopher as the specifically materialist 
approach to the ethical (Wolfe, 2007). One should bear in mind that our 
ability to laugh has sometimes been presented as a unique mark of the 
human, precisely, over and against a cold, mechanical, inhuman 
universe. As La Mettrie could have said to complicate matters when he 
was challenged, if we are just machines, what about laughter? Or: yes, 
we are just machines, but machines that laugh. The figure of 
Democritus as the laughing philosopher appears in one notable 
philosophical context, a letter from Spinoza to his correspondent Henry 
Oldenburg: 
If this celebrated ancient who laughed at everything were alive 
today, he would undoubtedly die of laughter. For my part, these 
troubles neither make me laugh, nor make me cry; they incite 
me instead to philosophize and observe human nature better. 
For I do not feel that I have the right to mock nature, or even 
more, to complain about it, for I think that human beings, like 
all other beings, are just a part of Nature (letter 30, in Spinoza, 
2002, p. 844).  
That Spinoza wants to distinguish himself from the ‘ridentes’, the 
laughing one, is clear and a well-known point. But we should reflect on 
what this laughter implies: it is founded on naturalism – we are all parts 
of Nature – but instead of simply flowing into, say, a program for 
scientific investigation, it takes the form of a disturbing, destabilizing 
affect. Antonio Negri, a celebrated reader of Spinoza, has made much 
the same point in a different vocabulary: “laughter indicates the 
territory across which power, that is, the ontological dynamic towards 
the real, extends,” and he contrasts this ‘power’ with the way the 
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Romantics “turned laughter into irony” (Negri, 2009, pp. 59-60, note C; 
translation modified). 
Laughter here is not just some psychological or cultural 
phenomenon (nor a sign of human uniqueness). Rather, it is 
reductionist laughter. In a different letter, to the Gorcum magistrate 
Hugo Boxel, who was pestering Spinoza because of his (Boxel’s) firm 
belief in the existence of ghosts, Spinoza cites Democritus explicitly: 
“The authority of Plato, Aristotle and Socrates carries little weight with 
me. I should have been surprised if you had produced Epicurus, 
Democritus, Lucretius or one of the atomists . . .” (letter 56, in Spinoza, 
2002, p. 903). That indicates that the difference between Spinoza and 
Democritus when it came to superstitions (in this example) was fairly 
non-existent. This reductionist laughter has political significance: 
Democritus served not only as a defender of the Enlightenment against 
all kinds of superstitions but was associated with social reform and 
revolutions, particularly during the French Revolution. We possess, 
from that period, a "Democritean hymn," sung by the Francophile 
faction in Leiden to the tune of the Marseillaise, which ends on these 
unforgettable lines: "Strong be our link with France's free 
terrain!/Democritus's good cheer must never, never wane!"26 Indeed, 
Democritean good cheer is also Bakhtin’s laughter that ‘lowers and 
materializes’ (Bakhtin, 1964, Introduction; discussion in Wolfe, 2007). 
Contrast this laughter from below with more ‘holistic’ praise for, 
literally, the top-down view (here, from the noted theoretical biologist 
Robert Rosen): 
 
                                                             
26 Anon., Democritische Feestzangen, bij der eerste verjaaring der Revolutie van het Jaar 
1795 [n.p.], p. 37: “Steeds beloeij' ons vast Verbond met Frankrijks vrij gebiet!/Hoezee! 
(bis) nooit flaauw' de pret in't vrolijk Democriet!” (bis), cited in Lüthy, 2000, p. 460. 
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No one likes to come down from the top of a tall building, from 
where vistas and panoramas are visible, and inspect a window-
less basement. We know, intellectually, that there could be no 
panoramas without the basement, but emotionally, we feel no 
desire to look at it directly; indeed, we feel an aversion. Above 
all, there is no beauty; there are only dark corners and 
dampness and airlessness. It is sufficient to know that the 
building stands on it, that its supports, its pipes and plumbing 
are in place and functioning (Rosen, 1991, p. 39). 
That the materialist laughs at human norms and values – at the 
fascination with “vistas and panoramas” – is different to simply 
reducing them to something more inert and formulaic, as became more 
common in the nineteenth century, e.g., Hyppolite Taine’s “vice and 
virtue are products just like vitriol and sugar” (Taine, 1863, I, 
introduction, p. xv): every complex datum emerges out of the 
encounter of other more basic data on which it depends (the atomistic 
moment), or more (in)famously, the German ‘vulgar materialist’ Carl 
Vogt stating that  
all the properties we refer to as the activity of the soul are just 
functions of cerebral substance, and to put this more crudely, 
thought is (more or less) to the brain what bile is to the liver 
and urine to the kidneys. It is absurd to allow for an 
independent soul using the brain as an instrument…
27
  
or “What we call the soul is simply the set of functions of the central 
nervous system.”28 The materialist is not (just) the anatomist of the 
 
                                                             
27 Vogt, 1875, pp. 347-348 (Vogt’s 13th Inaugural Lecture at the University of Giessen in 
1845). For a similar formulation to Vogt’s (thought=bile) see Cabanis, 1802, p. 151. 
28 ”L’origine de l’homme,” La Revue Scientifique 12 (1877), p. 1058, cit. in Pont, 1998, p. 
142. 
VITAL MATERIALISM 57 
 
heart or soul, à la Flaubert. That is, the radicality of reduction I am 
speaking of is not wholly synonymous with a kind of positivist 
neutrality, like the “indispensable inhumanity” recommended by the 
surgeon William Hunter, with respect to the value of vivisection and 
experimentation overall.29  
Thereby, materialist laughter (or laughing materialism), not being a 
project to find the bio-chemical (neuronal, hormonal, genetic, etc.) 
formula or explanation for behavior, consciousness, morals, etc., also 
does not bind us in the “blind causal chains” in which Sartre thought 
materialism imprisoned us (Sartre, 1990, p. 86). We may not want to be 
materialists about ethics, but it should be harder at this point to claim 
either that Enlightenment materialism was “mechanistic materialism,” 
or that it was incapable of dealing the inner life of thought and 
emotion, or that the emergence of modern science meant, as 
Horkheimer suggested, that “Nature lost every vestige of vital 
independent existence, all value of its own. It became dead matter – a 
heap of things” (Horkheimer, 1996, p. 359). Further, to laugh at 
superstition – or, less brightly, to acknowledge the limited control we 
have over our organic impulses – is different from literally being blind 
to value. This is different from simply claiming that materialism opens 
onto a Necropolis, a universe of dead matter, although we might 
surmise that it is a more subtle descendent of the latter view. 
For instance, Raymond Ruyer, an idiosyncratic French philosopher 
of science of the 1940s-1960s whose influence on Deleuze means that he 
is being rediscovered today, suggests a thought-experiment in an article 
entitled ‘What is Living and What is Dead in Materialism’, which has 
gone rather unnoticed (it appeared in 1933…). Imagine a law court as 
seen through the eyes of a materialist: “The halo of meanings, essences 
 
                                                             
29 On this see Steintrager, 2004, p. 64; Chamayou, 2008, p. 78. 
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and values,” in other words, everything relevant about the scene, 
vanishes, and what is left is the “functioning of a sort of complicated 
mechanics” whereby brains produce articulations, which in turn 
generate vibrations in the air, and thereby modify other nervous 
systems (Ruyer, 1933, p. 28). Everything takes place in the present, 
which is made up of strictly quantifiable events; psychological or social 
reality is an emanation which can always be reduced to physical 
processes. Basically, materialism is a strange kind of reductionism 
which denies the reality of social institutions, values, and of course 
minds. It is curious that both dialectical materialists of the old-
fashioned kind (including, for present purposes, Sartre in “Materialism 
and Revolution”) and spiritualist thinkers such as Ruyer give such an 
identical portrait of materialism as a historical episode. 
Historically, as I hope is clear by now, this portrait of dead 
materialism misses the vital character of the unique Radical 
Enlightenment formation we are interested in here. Ethically, it misses 
both the flesh-and-blood determinism of a La Mettrie and the more 
open organic vision of a Diderot, with its intimations of sympathy and 
affectivity. (La Mettrie himself, in his willingness to blur the boundary 
between animals and humans and thus to deny that we should be 
considered in either sanctified or secular-sanctified terms as somehow 
bearers of the Moral Law, can also write affectively, in one of the 
various ‘wild child’ stories he makes use of: “We now know that there 
are in Poland kind mother bears who steal newborn babies left on 
church doorsteps by careless wetnurses, and raise them with as much 
affection and kindness as if they were their own children” [Système 
d’Épicure, § xxxv, in La Mettrie, 1987, I, p. 365]). But metaphysically, the 
dead materialism accusation misses something important, in addition: 
the ontology of relations. 
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5 Materialism as an ontology of relations 
The radical Benedictine monk Dom Léger-Marie Deschamps, author of a 
massive atheist and materialist tract that was unpublished in the 
eighteenth century but that Diderot saw and admired, put forth what is 
probably the  most extensive Spinozist ontology in the Enlightenment. 
(Diderot wrote to Sophie Volland on August 31, 1769 speaking of 
Deschamps as an “apostle of materialism,” and, perhaps intimidated by 
the systematic character of the monk’s work, ends with a ironic twist, 
smirking at Deschamps’s belief that the “eternal order of Nature” could 
serve as a “sanction” for laws: Diderot, 1955-1970, vol IX, p. 123). In his 
systematic work (the word is in the title) La Vérité ou le vrai Système 
(begun 1761, resumed and completed between 1770 and his death in 
1774), Deschamps put forth an independently generated Spinozist 
metaphysics – something he felt materialism lacked in his time – in 
which “everything is composed mutually and ceaselessly in the whole” 
(Deschamps, 1993, p. 404), “bodies are constantly incorporating one 
another” (p. 382), such that “an entity is nothing other than the action 
of other entities upon it, and reciprocally, its action upon them” (p. 
345); “there is nothing that it does not contribute to composing, no 
composition it does not participate in” (p. 227). 
As Spinoza was probably the first to see (and the deepest), the 
experience that we belong to a fully causal universe, that we are parts 
(‘modes’) in this universe and nothing more (parts of Nature, as he 
wrote to Oldenburg) can also be extraordinarily liberating, in 
comparison with the inwardness or solitude emphasized by, amongst 
others, thinkers in a Cartesian vein. This kind of liberation was 
described quite well by Derek Parfit, in a personal-confessional mode, 
referring to the change that came over him once he began thinking 
about people in a reductionist way: 
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Is the truth depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it 
liberating, and consoling. When I believed that my existence 
was such a further fact [like a soul or something existing 
separately from one's experiences], I seemed imprisoned in 
myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was 
moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was 
darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass 
tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a 
difference between my life and the lives of other people. But 
the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less 
concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned 
about the lives of others (Parfit 1985, p. 281). 
This is what Spinoza describes as ‘common notions’, which make our 
persons – and, I might add, our minds – common. Common notions are 
conceptions of things “which are common to all” (Ethics II, proposition 
38). There are common notions shared between bodies, and the more I 
‘have’ or ‘know’ them, the more I have adequate knowledge of body, 
and more materialistically, the more my body has in common with 
other bodies, the more my mind is capable of perceiving things 
adequately (ibid., proposition 39). The common notions allow us to step 
beyond the consideration of singular things and see (some of) the 
greater causal network beyond us: we then see how finite modes are 
produced by an infinite substance. If this sounds far removed from 
Diderot, consider this passage from an unpublished review he wrote in 
1771: 
the moral world is so intimately tied to the physical world that 
it appears both are really one and the same machine. You were 
an atom in this great whole, time will reduce you to an atom in 
this great whole. Along the way, you have undergone a variety 
of metamorphoses . . . most importantly, that in which you 
walk on two feet, the only one which is accompanied by 
consciousness, the only one in which you constitute, through 
the memory of your successive actions, an individual called 
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myself. Act so that this self will be honored and respected, by 
itself, by those who coexist with it, and by those who shall 
come later.
30
 
Of course, Diderot is adding here an anthropological dimension, that of 
the constitution of the person; but this is not foreign to Spinoza either. 
6 Conclusion: on the possibility (and 
difficulty) of an Enlightenment materialist 
ethics 
The materialist need not, then, restrict his or her ethical purview to 
“wallowing in filth like pigs” (La Mettrie) or resigning herself to her 
monstrosity (Diderot), if not downright applauding it (Sade). She can 
embrace a Spinozist ontology of relations (Morfino, 2006), which makes 
the “walls of [our] glass tunnels disappear” (Parfit). And in this universe 
of interrelation and “constant composition” (Deschamps), there is room 
for praise and blame of the particular ‘ratio of motion and rest’ “which 
is accompanied by consciousness,” the only one in which the individual 
constitutes, through the memory of actions “an individual called 
myself” (Diderot again). 
However, a normative ethics is ruled out, of course. To return to the 
Diderot – La Mettrie tension for a moment, we can easily imagine that 
La Mettrie, by writing the Discours sur le Bonheur (which began life as 
an Anti-Seneca produced despite the best intentions of Maupertuis, who 
 
                                                             
30 Diderot, Dieu et l’homme (a review of Pierre-Louis Sissous de Valmire, Dieu et 
l’homme, Amsterdam (Troyes), 1771, intended for the Correspondance littéraire but 
unpublished, in Diderot, 1975-, XX, pp. 655-656. 
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had secured him a contract to write a biography of Seneca in the hopes 
of downplaying his fellow malouin’s bad reputation), gleefully affirms 
this destruction of normativity. Diderot is less cheerful: 
I am convinced that, even in as badly ordered a society as ours, 
where the success of vice is often applauded, whereas the 
failure of virtue is ridiculed – I am convinced, then, that the 
best way for us to achieve happiness is by doing good; this is 
the most important and interesting work, which I shall recall 
with the greatest satisfaction in my final moments. It is a 
question I’ve meditated on a hundred times . . .; I had all the 
data I needed; should I admit this? I never even dared take up 
my pen to write the first line. I said to myself: if I do not emerge 
victorious from this attempt, I shall become the apologist of 
wickedness, I will have betrayed the cause of virtue, and 
encouraged man towards vice. No, I do not feel up to this 
sublime labor; I would devote my life to it, pointlessly 
(Refutation of Helvétius, in Diderot, 1994, p. 832). 
Diderot wanted to write a work of moral philosophy but abandoned the 
project because if it had not been (intellectually) successful, he feared 
that he would then become an “apologist of wickedness,” thereby 
betraying “the cause of virtue”; contrary to La Mettrie or Sade, he did 
not want to ensure “the immortality of the evildoer.”31 Diderot might 
have derived some comfort from Locke, for whom it is by no means a 
failure to not write moral philosophy, but instead, a positive ethical 
sign. Locke wrote, in his recommendations for the education of the son 
of his friend Lady Peterborough, that the young man should read Livy 
(for history), along with geography and the study of morality. But, he 
explained, “I mean not the ethics of the schools,” but rather Tully (i.e. 
 
                                                             
31 Diderot, Réfutation d’Helvétius, in Diderot, 1994, p. 832; Essai sur les règnes de Claude 
et de Néron, II, 6, in Diderot, 1994, p. 1119. 
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Cicero), Pufendorf, Aristotle and “above all the New Testament,” 
wherein “a man may learn how to live which is the business of ethics, 
and not how to define and distinguish and dispute about the names of 
virtue and vice.”32 Works of professional moral philosophy were the 
worst way to go. But Diderot did wrote brilliant works in which a 
(home-grown, constructed) Spinozism is at work, also integrating the 
new discoveries and conceptual shifts in the life sciences (Wolfe, 2012). 
Yet if we only emphasize this openness to relations and 
transformation, we miss or omit  the shocking component, the 
‘destructive moment’ as I have called it. For if we seek to hygienically 
isolate the La Mettrie situation as a ‘mad dog’ episode of materialism, 
we lose sight of what is unique in the reductionism. From Lucretius, 
Hobbes and La Mettrie onto Cabanis, Vogt and the Churchlands, 
reductionism is not something the materialist keeps in a closet.  And as 
noted, the reductionism here is corporeal, or even carnal – but qua 
reductionism (whether from soul to body, from free will to organic 
determinism, or from values and norms to medico-materialist 
concepts), its presence implies that the specifically vital dimension 
should not, conversely, be taken in the direction of a kind of holist 
vitalism “markedly at odds with the universalizing discourse of 
Encyclopedist materialism, with its insistence on the uniformity of 
nature and the universality of physical laws” (Williams, 2003, p. 177); 
vital materialism is still materialism. And in its radical dimension, it is 
capable of laughing at humanity (Democritus, La Mettrie). Presumably, 
only warm-blooded creatures with hearts, livers, brains and therefore 
emotions, do laugh.  
 
                                                             
32 Locke to Cary Mordaunt, 1697, first reproduced in King 1829, pp. 5-6, also cit. in 
Ashcraft 1991, p. 235, emphasis mine; much the same idea is present in Locke, Thoughts 
Concerning Education, § 185 and Reasonableness of Christianity, §§ 241-242. 
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Of course, not all materialists would agree with this emphasis on the 
biological, since it seems to perturb the standard identification of 
materialism with physicalism; some reduce all causes to physical causes, 
like Hobbes and d’Holbach. But, to put it briefly, what this ‘biologism’ 
allows for is a combination of the power of reductionist explanation and 
a recognition of the ‘unpredictability’ of Life – a kind of matérialisme 
aléatoire, the classical figure of which was the monster (Wolfe, 2005). 
Unlike, say, the teratologist Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire in the early 
1800s, Diderot does not seek to demystify the ontological status of 
monsters by providing a quantitative analysis of their parts and the 
processes of generation which brought them about. Instead, he remains 
fascinated by their destabilizing potential, as wholly natural beings who 
are also contra naturam. 
Radical Enlightenment materialism is more of an ‘uncertain 
materialism’ (matérialisme aléatoire, in the late Althusser’s phrase: 
Althusser, 1994, 2005) than a search for laws of nature and other forms 
of ultimate order. Yet its destructive, destabilizing tendencies – its 
“demaskierende Tendenz,” in Adorno’s words – are not always foreign 
to the project we might call ‘science’: La Mettrie memorably calls for 
what we would today think of as the recognition of clinical (whether 
bodily and/or psychiatric) factors in judging the actions of a criminal: 
“It would doubtless be desirable for there to be only excellent Doctors 
to serve as Judges, for only they could distinguish the innocent from the 
guilty criminal” (L’Homme-Machine, in La Mettrie, 1987, I, p. 91). But 
doesn’t this only serve as a temporary way of distinguishing between 
individuals, condemned to sink back into the organic ‘piggishness’ we 
saw earlier? Not if the materialist appeals to a Spinozist, relational 
ontology. Nor if she reflects on our existence as affective beings. 
Machines don’t laugh, and laughter at norms is not synonymous with 
delectation in crime. 
 
VITAL MATERIALISM 65 
 
Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences  
Sarton Centre for History of Science 
Ghent University 
Email: charles.wolfe@ugent.be 
REFERENCES 
Althusser, L. (1994) ‘Le courant souterrain du matérialisme de la rencontre’ and 
‘Portrait du philosophe matérialiste’, in Écrits philosophiques et politiques, 
vol. I, ed. F. Matheron. Stock/IMEC, Paris 
Althusser, L. (2005) ‘Du matérialisme aléatoire’, ed. F. Matheron, Multitudes 21, 
pp. 179-194 
(Anon.) (2003) L’Âme matérielle, éd. A. Niderst. Champion, Paris. 
Ashcraft, R. (1991) ‘Locke’s State of Nature’, in Ashcraft, ed., Locke. Critical 
Assessments, vol. 2, Routledge, London, pp. 212-241 
Bakhtin, M. (1984) Rabelais and his world (1965), trans. H. Iswolsky. Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington. 
Bayle, P. (1737) Œuvres diverses, vol. III (of IV). Compagnie des libraires, The 
Hague. 
Bayle, P. (1740) Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), 4 vols., 5th edition. 
Pierre Brunel et al., Amsterdam-Leiden-The Hague. 
Benítez, M. (1996) ‘Le doute comme méthode : scepticisme et matérialisme dans 
la littérature clandestine’, in Benítez, La face cachée des Lumières, 
Universitas/Voltaire Foundation, Paris/Oxford, pp. 307-342 
Benítez, M. (1998)  ‘Y a-t-il une philosophie clandestine? Le statut des copies 
manuscrites du De rerum natura’, La Lettre clandestine 7, pp. 355-368 
Blanchot, M. (1963) Lautréamont et Sade [1949]. Minuit, Paris 
Bloch, O. (1995) Le matérialisme, 2nd edition. PUF, coll. “Que sais-je?”, Paris 
Bourdin, J-C. (1992) Hegel et les matérialistes français. Klincksieck, Paris 
Cabanis, P.-J.-G. (1802) Rapports du physique et du moral. Crapart, Caille et 
Ravier, Paris. 
Cartwright, N. (1999) The Dappled World. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Chamayou, G. (2008) Les corps vils: expérimenter sur les êtres humains aux 
XVIIIe et XIXe siècles. La Découverte / Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 
Paris. 
66 C. WOLFE 
 
Chouillet, A.-M., ed. (1993) Les ennemis de Diderot. Klincksieck, Paris. 
Citton, Y. (2006) L’Envers de la liberté. L’invention d’un imaginaire spinoziste 
dans la France des Lumière. Éditions Amsterdam, Paris. 
Citton, Y., Lordon, F., eds. (2008) Spinoza et les sciences sociales. De la 
puissance de la multitude à l’économie des affects. Editions Amsterdam, 
Paris. 
Colletti, L. (1979) Marxism and Hegel, Verso, London. 
Crocker, L.G. (1959) An Age of Crisis. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Cudworth, R. (1897) A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality 
[written before 1688; first published posthumously in 1731], in Selby-Bigge, 
L.A. (1897) British Moralists, being Selections from Writers principally of 
the Eighteenth Century, in two volumes, vol. 2. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Dagron, T. (2009) Toland et Leibniz. L'invention du néo-spinozisme. Vrin, Paris.  
Deschamps, L.-M. (1993) Œuvres philosophiques. Vrin, Paris. 
[Dictionnaire de Trévoux] (1704). Dictionnaire universel françois et latin, 
contenant la signification et la définition tant des mots de l'une et de 
l'autre langue... que des termes propres de chaque état et de chaque 
profession... la description de toutes les choses naturelles et artificielles... ; 
l'explication de tout ce que renferment les sciences et les arts... Avec des 
remarques d'érudition... chez Etienne Ganeau, Trévoux. 
Diderot, D. (1955-1970) Correspondance, ed. Roth, G., 9 vols. Éditions de Minuit, 
Paris 
Diderot, D. (1975-) Œuvres complètes, eds. Dieckmann, H., Proust, J., Varloot, J. 
Hermann, Paris. 
Diderot, D. (1994) Œuvres, ed. L. Versini, vol. 1: Philosophie. R. Laffont-
Bouquins, Paris 
Flaubert, G. (1925) ‘Passion et vertu’ (Nov.-Dec. 1837 fragment), in Premières 
œuvres. Fasquelle, Paris. 
Frederick II (1985) Œuvres philosophiques, eds. Armogathe, J.-R., Bourel, D. 
Fayard, Paris 
Haakonssen, K. (2006) ‘The concept of eighteenth-century philosophy’, in 
Haakonssen, ed., The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century 
Philosophy, pp. 3-25. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1971) Einleitung in der Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. J. 
Hoffmeister. Felix Meiner, Hamburg 
Hill, E. (1968) ‘Materialism and Monsters in the Rêve de D’Alembert’, Diderot 
Studies 10, pp. 67-93 
VITAL MATERIALISM 67 
 
Horkheimer, M. (1996) ‘Reason against itself: Some Remarks on Enlightenment’ 
(December 1946 lecture to the American Philosophical Association), in 
Schmidt, J., ed., What is Enlightenment? 18th-Century Answers and 20th-
Century Questions. University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 359-367 
Hugo, V. (1968) Œuvres complètes de Victor Hugo: édition chronologique, 
Massin, J., dir., vol. IX. Club Français du Livre, Paris. 
Husserl, E. (1910-1911) ‘Die Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft’, Logos 1, pp. 
289-341 
Israel, J. (2001) Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of 
Modernity, 1650-1750. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Jaucourt, Chevalier de (1765) ‘Sympathie (Physiolog.)’, Encyclopédie ou 
Dictionnaire raisonné des arts et des métiers, eds. D. Diderot, J. Le Rond 
D’Alembert, vol. XV. Briasson, David, Le Breton & Durand, Paris, pp. 736a-
740a 
Kass, L. (2002) ‘The Permanent Limitations of Biology’, in Kass, Life, Liberty, and 
the Defense of Dignity. Encounter Books, San Francisco, online at 
http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/medical_ethics/me0052.html 
Kaitaro, T. (2004) ‘Diderot and La Mettrie: the unacknowledgeable debt’, in 
Hecht, H., ed., La Mettrie. Ansichten und Einsichten, Berlin Wissenschafts-
Verlag, Berlin, pp. 63-73 
King, P., Lord (1829) The life of John Locke, with extracts from his 
correspondence, journals, and common-place book. H. Colburn, London 
Klossowski, P. (1947) Sade mon prochain, new edition, 1967. Seuil, Paris  
La Mettrie, J.O. de (1987) Œuvres philosophiques, ed. F. Markovits, 2 vols. 
Fayard-Corpus, Paris. 
Leduc-Fayette D. (1979) ‘Le ‘cas’ La Mettrie’,  in Bloch, O., ed., Images au XIXe 
siècle du matérialisme du XVIIIe siècle. Desclée, Paris, pp. 103-116 
Lelarge de Lignac, Abbé J.-A. (1760) Le témoignage du sens intime et de 
l’expérience opposé à la foi profane et ridicule des fatalistes modernes, 3 
vols. F. Fournier, Auxerre.  
Lüthy, C. (2000) ‘The Fourfold Democritus on the stage of early modern 
science’, Isis 91(3), pp. 443-479 
Marx, K., Engels, F. (1959) Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. L.S. 
Feuer. Doubleday / Anchor Books, New York. 
Marx, K., Engels, F. (1982) Werke, vol. 21. Dietz Verlag, Berlin.  
Masseau, D. (2000) Les ennemis des philosophes. L’antiphilosophie au temps 
des Lumières. Albin Michel, Paris. 
68 C. WOLFE 
 
Mayr, O. (1986) Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern 
Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.  
Ménuret de Chambaud, J.-J. (1765) ‘Spasme (Médec. Patholog.)’, Encyclopédie 
ou Dictionnaire raisonné des arts et des métiers, eds. D. Diderot, J. Le Rond 
D’Alembert, vol. XV. Briasson, David, Le Breton & Durand, Paris, pp. 434-
438. 
Mintz, S.I. (1962) The Hunting of Leviathan: seventeenth-century reactions to 
the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
More, H. (1668) Divine Dialogues, Containing sundry Disquisitions and 
Instructions Concerning the Attributes and Providence of God in the 
World… Flesher, London 
Morfino, V. (2006) ‘Spinoza: An Ontology of Relation?’, Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal 27-1, pp. 103-127 
Mornet, D.  (1941) Diderot, l’homme et l'œuvre. Boivin, Paris. 
Nakagawa, H. (1995) ‘Spiritualité et matière chez Diderot encyclopédiste’, in 
Albertan-Coppola, S., Chouillet, A.-M. , eds., La matière et l’homme dans 
l’Encyclopédie. Klincksieck, Paris,  pp. 23-30 
Negri, A. (1997) ‘Travail et affect’, Futur Antérieur 39-40, pp. 45-56. Online at : 
http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Travail-et-affect 
Negri, A. (2004) ‘Spinoza’s Anti-Modernity’, trans. C.T. Wolfe (1991), reprinted 
in Negri, Subversive Spinoza, ed. T.S. Murphy. Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, pp. 79-93; online at http://www.generation-
online.org/p/fpnegri10.htm  
Negri, A. (2009) The Labor of Job: The Biblical Text as a Parable of Human 
Labor, trans. M. Mandarini. Duke University Press, Durham, NC. 
Nicole, P. (1714) Essais de morale (original edition 1671), Second discours, 
Contenant en abrégé les preuves naturelles de l’existence de Dieu. G. 
Desprez, Paris. 
Overhoff, J. (2000) Hobbes' Theory of the Will: Ideological Reasons and 
Historical Circumstances. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD. 
Parfit, D. (1985) Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Plekhanov, G. (1934) Essays on the History of Materialism, trans. R. Fox 
(original publication, 1896). Jonathan Lane, London. 
Pont, J.-Cl. (1998) ‘Aspects du matérialisme de Carl Vogt’, in Pont, J.-Cl. et al., 
eds., Carl Vogt (1817-1895). Science, philosophie et politique. Georg, 
Geneva, pp. 111-175 
Pope, A. (1735) Letters of Mr. Pope and Several Eminent Persons: From the Year 
1705 to 1735. F. Cooper, London. 
VITAL MATERIALISM 69 
 
Pope, A. (1958) An Essay on Man, ed. Mack, M. Yale University Press, New 
Haven. 
Prior, M. (1971) Literary Works, eds. Wright, H.B. and Spears, M.K., 2 vols. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Reill, P.H. (2005) Vitalizing Nature In The Enlightenment. University Of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
Rosen, R.  (1991) Life Itself. Columbia University Press, New York 
Ruyer, R. (1930) Esquisse d’une philosophie de la structure. Alcan, Paris. 
Ruyer, R. (1933) ‘Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort dans le matérialisme’, 
Revue Philosophique 116(7-8), pp. 28-49. 
Sade, D.A.F. (1986) Œuvres complètes, eds. Le Brun, A., Pauvert. J.-J., vol. 1. 
Editions J.-J. Pauvert, Paris. 
Sade, D.A.F. (1998) Œuvres, ed. Delon, M., vol. 3. Gallimard-Pléiade, Paris. 
Sartre, J.-P. (1990) ‘Matérialisme et révolution’ (1946), in Situations 
philosophiques. Gallimard, Paris, pp. 81-140. 
Schopenhauer, A. (1977) Zürcher Ausgabe. Werke in zehn Bänden. Der Text 
folgt der historisch-kritischen Ausgabe von Arthur Hübscher. Die 
editorischen Materialien besorgte Angelika Hübscher. Redaktion von 
Claudia Schmölders, Fritz Senn und Gerd Haffmanns. Diogenes, Zürich 
Secrétan, S., Dagron, T. and Bove, L., eds. (2007) Qu’est-ce que les Lumières 
‘radicales’ ? Libertinage, athéisme et spinozisme dans le tournant 
philosophique de l’âge classique. Éditions Amsterdam, Paris. 
Spinoza, B. (2002) Complete Works, trans. S. Shirley. Hackett, Indianapolis. 
Steintrager, J. (2004) Cruel Delights. Enlightenment Culture and the Inhuman. 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 
Taine, H. (1863) Histoire de la littérature anglaise. Hachette, Paris. 
Thomson, A. (1988) ‘L’homme-machine, mythe ou métaphore ?’, Dix-huitième 
siècle 20, pp. 368-376 
Thompson, E. (2007) Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of 
mind. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Vassails, G. (1951) ‘L’Encyclopédie et la physique’, Revue d’histoire des sciences 
4, pp. 294-323 
Velluz, L. (1969) Maupertuis. Hachette, Paris. 
Vogt, C. (1875) Lettres physiologiques. Reinwald, Paris 
Williams, E.A. (2003) A cultural history of medical vitalism in Enlightenment 
Montpellier. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
70 C. WOLFE 
 
Wolfe, C.T. (2004-2005) ‘Essere significa essere in vista di un fine. Aristotele e la 
disputa col materialismo’, Quaderni materialisti 3/4, pp. 89-126. 
Wolfe, C.T. (2005) ‘The Materialist Denial of Monsters’, in Wolfe, C.T., ed., 
Monsters and Philosophy,. King’s College Publications, London, pp. 187-204 
Wolfe, C.T. (2006) ‘La Mettrie’, in Di Folco, P., ed., Dictionnaire de la mort. 
Laffont, coll. ‘Bouquins’, Paris, pp. 605-606 
Wolfe, C.T. (2007) ‘Le rire matérialiste’, Multitudes 30, pp. 177-185 
Wolfe, C.T. (2012) ‘Forms of Materialist Embodiment’, in Landers,  M., Muñoz, 
B., eds., Anatomy and the Organisation of Knowledge, 1500-1850. Pickering 
and Chatto, London, pp. 129-144 
 
 
 
